An IND-CCA2 Secure Public Key Cryptographic Protocol using Suzuki 2-Group

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Abstract

Objectives: The public key cryptographic protocol is one of the most important fields in computer security. These new public key cryptographic protocols provide high security as compare to past results in the same field.

Methods/Statistical Analysis: Public key cryptographic is a protocol of transferring private info and data through open network communication, so only the receiver who has the secret key can read the encrypted messages which might be documents, phone conversations, images or other form of data. To implement privacy simply by encrypting the information intended to remain secret can be achieved by using methods of public key cryptography.

Findings: In this study, we propose the new IND-CCA2 secure public key cryptographic protocol using the concept of integral coefficient ring polynomial based on Suzuki 2-group. We demonstrated the security of proposed public key cryptographic protocol in the adaptively chosen cipher text secure (IND-CCA2) in the random oracle model.

Application/Improvements: We discussed the new strategy with change over an IND-CPA public key cryptographic protocol into an IND-CCA2 cryptographic protocol.

Keywords: IND-CCA2, Public Key Cryptography, Ring Polynomial, Random Oracle, Suzuki 2-Group

1. Introduction

The conception of Public Key Cryptography (PKC) first brought in public domain and introduced1. Since then various public key cryptographic protocols have been developed but could not take desired results. It is a one-way functions show the significant roles in the conception of public key cryptographic protocols. On the apparent difficulty of specific predicaments specifically huge finite commutative rings, these days most prosperous public key cryptographic protocols are established.

To outline public key cryptographic protocol using the undesirable word issue for groups and semi-groups is proposed2. The thought is really not in view of word issue, but rather on another, comparatively easier, introduce issue. For a new public key cryptographic protocol which depends on finitely gave assemblies hard word problem3.

One of successful key establishment protocol came up with a compact algebraic structure4. The establishment of their strategy included in the difficulty of explaining conditions over arithmetical structure. Subsequently the first proposed new public key cryptographic protocol is used by braid groups5. The security foundation is that when the framework parameters, for example, braid index and the canonical length of the working braids, are chosen legitimately, the Conjugator Search Problem (CSP) is unmanageable. A new public key cryptographic protocol built on finite non-abelian groups was published6.

Homomorphic public key cryptographic protocol was developed for the first time for non-abelian groups7. Afterwards, the extended and expanded their process
to discretionary nonidentity finite groups in view of the difficulty of the participation issue for groups of integer matrices. Edified thought the number-crunching key exchange, proposed a new public key cryptographic protocol using polycyclic groups.

Generic algebraic systems are especially a non-commutative one which is creating its significances, making its marks and attracting many among the above public key cryptographic protocols. There are some difficulties of resolving CSP over certain non-abelian groups using non-commutative algebraic systems. In spite of the fact that there are algorithms for understanding a few variations of CSP in specific groups, such as braid groups with respect to the system parameters, none of them can resolve CSP itself defined over general non-abelian group in polynomial time. However, non-commutative acts favorably and unfavorably from one perspective, it makes CSP significant; then again, it brings some bother for planning public key cryptographic protocols. Rectifying the problem, making it favorable is the key concern for developing public key cryptographic protocol over non-commutative algebraic systems.

1.1 Organization
In this article, we establish new ideas for scheming adaptively chosen cipher-text secure (IND-CCA2) secure public key cryptographic protocol using the concept of dihedral group. The main idea of our purpose is to define the technique in polynomials and take them as the fundamental work structure for a given dihedral group. By doing so, it is much easy to implement the effective IND-CCA2 secure public key cryptographic protocol in the random oracle model.

1.2 The Structure of the Article
This paper is sorted out as takes after. In Section 2, preliminaries are presented; In Section 3, we demonstrated some extension over dihedral group; In Section 4, we proposed new IND-CCA2 secure public key cryptographic protocol using dihedral group. In Section 5, we demonstrated supporting example for proposed new public key cryptographic protocol. The security of proposed public key cryptographic protocol is discussed in Section 6. Finally, concluding remarks are made in Section 7.

2. Preliminaries
In this segment, we demonstrated required basic definition of integer coefficient ring polynomials and its properties.

2.1 Integral Coefficient Ring Polynomials (ICRP)
Assume $(\mathfrak{R}, *, 1)$ is algebraic structure for ring $\mathfrak{R}$ with multiplicative operation $\ast$ of non-commutative semi group and $(\mathfrak{R}, +, 0)$ is algebraic structure with additive operation $+$ of commutative group. Now we consider Integral Coefficient Polynomials (ICP) with ring assignment as follows:

For $\mathfrak{z} \in \mathfrak{R}_{\geq 0}$ and $\theta \in \mathfrak{R}$,

\[(\mathfrak{z})^\theta = \theta + \cdots + \theta (l \text{ times})\]

When $\mathfrak{z} \in \mathfrak{R}_{> 0}$, we can define

\[(\mathfrak{z})^\theta = (-\mathfrak{z})^\theta = (-\theta) + \cdots + (-\theta) (\mathfrak{z} \text{ times})\]

For $\mathfrak{z} = 0$, it is normal to define $(\mathfrak{z})^\theta = 0$.

Property 1.

\[(a)^\theta \cdot (b)^\theta = (ab)^\theta = (a\theta)^\delta (a\theta, \forall a, \beta, \delta, \theta \in \mathfrak{R})\]

2.1.1 Proof

As indicated by the definition of the distributive of multiplication, scale multiplication concerning commutative of addition and addition, this statement is finished up instantly.

Remark. In non-commutative ring $\mathfrak{R}$, we get

Presently, let us continue to define positive ICRP

\[(a)\theta \neq (b)k \neq (a)\theta \text{ for } \theta \neq k.\]

We can allocate this polynomial by utilizing a component in $\mathfrak{R}$ and finally get

\[A(\theta) = \sum_{\theta \geq 0}(\alpha_\theta)\theta^\theta = (a_\theta)1 + (a_1)\theta + \cdots + (a_j)\theta^j(3)\]

This is a component in $\mathfrak{R}$, obviously. Advance, in the event that we view as a component in $\mathfrak{R}$, then
The arrangement of these types of polynomials, assuming over all \( \hat{A}_i(u) \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^i} [\theta] \) can be observed the expansion of \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^i} \) with, indicated by \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^i} [\theta] \). For comfort, we call it the arrangement of 1-ary positive ICRP.

Assume that
\[
\delta(\theta) = \sum_{\beta} (\sigma_\beta) \theta^\ell \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^i} [\theta], \quad \delta(\theta) = \sum_{\beta} (\sigma_\beta) \theta^\ell \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^i} [\theta], \quad \ell \geq i,
\]
then
\[
\left( \sum_{\alpha} (\sigma_\alpha) \theta^\ell \right) \left( \sum_{\beta} (\sigma_\beta) \theta^\ell \right) = \left( \sum_{\alpha} (\sigma_\alpha) \theta^\ell \right) \left( \sum_{\beta} (\sigma_\beta) \theta^\ell \right)
\]

Also, as per Property 1 and additionally the distributive, we have
\[
\left( \sum_{\alpha} (\sigma_\alpha) \theta^\ell \right) \left( \sum_{\beta} (\sigma_\beta) \theta^\ell \right) = \left( \sum_{\alpha} (\sigma_\alpha) \theta^\ell \right) \left( \sum_{\beta} (\sigma_\beta) \theta^\ell \right)
\]

we can finish up instantly the following hypothesis as per Property 1.

**Theorem 2.1**
\[
\hat{A}_i(\theta), \quad \delta(\theta) = \hat{A}_i(\theta) \cdot \hat{A}_i(\theta), \quad \forall \hat{A}_i(\theta), \quad \delta(\theta) \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^i} [\theta].
\]

**Remark 3.** If \( \theta \) and \( \alpha \) are two distinct components, then

**2.2 Suzuki 2-Group**

In the first place, we review some essential actualities about \( \mathbb{A}_i \)-groups, where \( \mathbb{A}_i \) means a prime number. A limited gathering \( \mathbb{G}_S \) of request a force of \( \mathbb{A}_i \) is called a \( \mathbb{A}_i \)-group, i.e., \( \mathbb{G}_S \approx \mathbb{A}_i n \) for a specific positive number \( n \). The smallest common multiple of the order of the component of \( \mathbb{G}_S \) is known as the exponent of \( \mathbb{G}_S \). An abelian \( \mathbb{A}_i \)-group \( \mathbb{G}_S \) of exponent \( \mathbb{A}_i \) is said to be rudimentary abelian.

The set \( \mathbb{Z}(\mathbb{G}_S) = \{ z \in \mathbb{G}_S : \mathbb{G}z = z \mathbb{G}, \forall z \in \mathbb{G}_S \} \) is known as the center of \( \mathbb{G}_S \). It is outstanding that \( \mathbb{Z}(\mathbb{G}_S) \) is a normal subgroup of request at any rate \( \mathbb{A}_i \) for any \( \mathbb{A}_i \)-group \( \mathbb{G}_S \). The subgroup \( \mathbb{G}_S \) created by every one of the components of the arrangement \( m^{-1}n^{-1}m \) with \( m, n \in \mathbb{G}_S \) is known as the commentator subgroup of \( \mathbb{G}_S \). The alleged Frattini subgroup of \( \mathbb{G}_S \), indicated by \( e_{\mathbb{G}_S} = \mathbb{G}_{\mathbb{G}_S} \mathbb{S} \). At last, a component of order 2 in a gathering is called an involution.

Formally, a Suzuki 2-group is well characterized as a non-abelian 2-group with more than one involution having a cyclic group of automorphisms which permutes its involutions transitively. This class of 2-group was analyzed and described by 17.

Specifically, in any Suzuki 2-group \( \mathbb{G}_S \) we have \( \mathbb{Z}(\mathbb{G}_S) = \varphi(\mathbb{G}_S) = \mathbb{G}_S' = \Omega_1(\mathbb{G}_S) \), where
\[
\Omega_1(\mathbb{G}_S) = \langle \delta \rangle = \frac{1}{\mathbb{G}} \in \mathbb{G}_S \rangle
\]

\( \mathbb{Z}(\mathbb{G}_S) \approx \mathbb{A}_i n, \eta > 1 \). It is appeared in 17 that the order of \( \delta \) is either \( \mathbb{A}_i 2^n \) or \( \mathbb{A}_i 3^n \). In this manner all the involution of \( \mathbb{G}_S \) are in the center of \( \mathbb{G}_S \), there \( \mathbb{Z}(\mathbb{G}_S) \) and the factor group \( \mathbb{G}_S/\mathbb{Z}(\mathbb{G}_S) \) are rudimentary abelian.

Subsequently, all components not in \( \mathbb{Z}(\mathbb{G}_S) \) have order 4. It is realized that \( \mathbb{G}_S \) has an automorphism \( \xi \) of order 4 consistently permuting the involution of \( \mathbb{G}_S \).

**2.3 Symmetrical Decomposition Problem (SDP)**

For given \( (\alpha, \delta) \in \mathbb{G}_S \times \mathbb{G}_S \) and \( j, i \in \mathbb{Z}_2 \), find \( z \in \mathbb{G}_S \) such that \( \delta = z^i \alpha z^j \).

**2.4 Polynomial Diffie-Hellman (PDH) Problem over Suzuki 2-Group**

Suppose that \( (\mathbb{G}_S, \cdot) \) is a Suzuki 2-group. For any arbitrarily selected component \( \delta \in \mathbb{G}_S \), we define a set \( \tau_\delta \subseteq \mathbb{G}_S \) by
\[
\tau_\delta = \{ (\delta(u) : u \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^i} ) \} \}
\]
At that point, let we consider the new forms of computational Diffie-Hellman problem over \( (\mathbb{G}_S, \cdot) \) with respect to its subset \( \tau_\delta \), it is known as polynomial Diffie-Hellman (PDH) problem and define as: For given \( x, y, z_1 \) and \( x, z_2 \), we compute \( x^{z_1z_2} \) (or \( x^{z_2z_1} \)), where \( x \in \mathbb{G}_S, \quad z_1, \quad z_2 \in \tau_\delta \).

Accordingly, the cryptographic based on PDH supposition says that PDH, problem over \( (\mathbb{G}_S, \cdot) \) is intractable, i.e., there doesn’t exist PPT process which can resolve PDH, problem over \( (\mathbb{G}_S, \cdot) \) with non-negligible precision w. r. t. problem scale.

**3. Extension of Over Suzuki 2-Group**

The technique portrayed in the above subsection 2.1 is suitable for general non-commutative rings. In similar way,
we can transfer these outcomes to general Suzuki 2-group.

Now, given a Suzuki 2-group \((G_{S}, \cdot, 1_{G_{S}})\).
Assume that there is a ring \((\mathbb{R}, +, \cdot, 1_{\mathbb{R}})\) and a monomorphism \(u : (G_{S}, \cdot, 1_{G_{S}}) \rightarrow (\mathbb{R}, +, \cdot, 1_{\mathbb{R}})\).
Then, the inverse map \(u^{-1} : (\mathbb{R}, +, \cdot, 1_{\mathbb{R}}) \rightarrow G_{S}\)
is also a well-defined monomorphism and for \(\alpha, \beta \in G_{S}\), \(u(\alpha) + u(\beta) \in u(G_{S})\), we can allot another component \(u \in G_{S}\) as
\[
\delta = u^{-1}(u(\alpha) + u(\beta)),
\]
and call \(\delta = \alpha \odot \beta\) as the quasi_sum of \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\).
Correspondingly, for \(\delta, \alpha \in G_{S}\), \(\alpha \in G_{S}\), if \(\kappa \cdot u(\alpha) \in u(G_{S})\), then we can allot another component\(\delta \in G_{S}\) as
\[
\alpha = u^{-1}(\kappa \cdot u(\alpha)),
\]
and call \(\alpha = \kappa \odot \alpha\) as the \(\kappa\) quasi_multiple of \(\alpha\).

At that point, we can see that the monomorphism \(u\) is linear in sense that the accompanying equalities hold
\[
u(\kappa \odot \alpha \odot \beta) = u((\kappa \odot \alpha) \odot \beta) = u(\kappa \odot (u(\alpha) + u(\beta))) = u(u^{-1}(u(\alpha) + u(\beta))).
\]

Further, for \(\mathcal{H}(u) \in \{0, 1\}_{\mathbb{Z}}^{\sum_{u \in 2[u]} \kappa \cdot u(\alpha) \dagger} \) and \(\alpha \in G_{S}\), if
\(\mathcal{H}(u(\alpha)) \in \{0, 1\}_{\mathbb{Z}}^{\sum_{u \in 2[u]} \kappa \cdot u(\alpha) \dagger} \) and \(\kappa \cdot u(\alpha) \in u(G_{S})\), then for new member \(\nu \in G_{S}\) as
\[
\nu = u^{-1}(\mathcal{H}(u(\alpha))) = u^{-1}(\sum_{u \in 2[u]} \kappa \cdot u(\alpha) \dagger) = \sum_{u \in 2[u]} \kappa \cdot u(\alpha) \dagger.
\]

and call \(\nu\) as the quasi_polynomial of \(\mathcal{H}\) on \(S\).

Clearly, for arbitrary \(\alpha, \beta \in G_{S}, \kappa \in \mathbb{R}\) and \(\mathcal{H}(u) \in 2[u], \alpha \odot \beta, \kappa \odot \alpha\) and \(\mathcal{H}(\alpha)\) are not always well-defined. But, we can prove that the following theorem holds.

### 3.1 Theorem

For some \(\alpha \in G_{S}\) and some \(\mathcal{H}(u), \mathcal{F}(u) \in 2[u]\), if \(\mathcal{H}(\alpha)\) and \(\mathcal{F}(\alpha)\) are well-defined, then

(i). \(\mathcal{H}(u(\alpha)) = \mathcal{H}(u(\alpha))\);

(ii). \(\mathcal{H}(\alpha), \mathcal{F}(\alpha) = \mathcal{F}(\alpha), \mathcal{H}(\alpha)\).

#### 3.1.1 Proof

(i). \(\mathcal{H}(\alpha) \circ \mathcal{F}(\alpha) = \mathcal{H}(\beta)\) is straightforward from the definition of quasi_polynomial.

(ii). \(\mathcal{H}(\alpha), \mathcal{F}(\alpha) = \mathcal{H}(\beta)\) using concept of Fujisaki and Okamoto.
4.3 Encryption
For given a $M \in \mathbb{K}$ and Receiver's key $(c, d, \alpha \beta)$, the sender
- Selects a random component $w \in \{0, 1\}^k$.
- Selects extracts polynomial $\tilde{f}(w) = f_1(M \parallel w) \in \mathbb{Z}[u]$ such that $\tilde{f}(c) \neq 0$.
- Calculates $s = \tilde{f}(c)^* d \ast \tilde{f}(c)^j, t = (M \parallel w) \Theta f_2(f(c)^* c \ast \tilde{f}(c)^j)$

Finally outputs the cipher-text $C=(s,t) \in \mathbb{K} \times \{0,1\}^{k+k_0}$.

4.4 Decryption
Upon getting a $C$, the receiver utilizing his/her private key $\tilde{k}(c)$, calculates

$$M' = \Theta \tilde{f}_2(f(c)^* d \ast \tilde{f}(c)^j)$$

Finally, extracts $\tilde{f}(c) = \tilde{f}_1(M') \in \mathbb{Z}[u]$ and checks whether $s = \tilde{f}(c)^* d \ast \tilde{f}(c)^j$ holds. Assuming this is the case, yields the starting $\alpha \beta$ bits of $M'$; generally, yields empty string, which implies that the given cipher-text is invalid.

5. Concrete Examples
In this segment, we illustrate example for supporting our proposed new public key cryptographic technique based on Suzuki 2-group.

Let us the class of Suzuki 2-group with order $p^2$. Utilizing Higman's documentation, a Suzuki 2-group of order $p^2$ will be indicated by $\delta(p^2)$. Assume $\mathcal{G} = 2^\eta$ where $\eta \geq 3$ belongs natural number such as an extent that the field $F_{p^2}$ has nontrivial automorphism $\theta$ of non-even order. This infers $\eta$ is not a force of 2. At that point the gatherings $\delta(\eta, \theta)$ do exist.

Honesty, in case we describe $\delta(\eta, \theta) = \delta(1, \theta_{1}) \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, where $\delta(1, \theta_{1}) \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ is a $3 \times 3$ -matrix over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$.

Give us a chance to delineate our technique by utilizing a Suzuki 2-group: $M_2(F_{p^2})$, where $\mathcal{N} = q \ast \mathcal{P}$ while $q$ and $\mathcal{P}$ are two extensive secure primes. We have strong motivation to trust that symmetrical decomposition problem over $M_2(\mathbb{GL}(3, p)) \subseteq M_2(F_{p^2}) \subseteq M_2(\mathcal{N})$

Form

$$Y^2 = \begin{pmatrix} \nu^2 \mod \mathcal{N} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \in M_3(\mathbb{GL}(3, p)) \subseteq M_3(F_{p^2}) \subseteq M_3(\mathcal{N}).$$

without knowing the figuring of $\mathcal{N}$.

Next, let $\mathcal{N} = 2 \cdot 5 = 10$ for instance. Assume that the framework parameters are

$$\tilde{c} = 2, \tilde{j} = 3,$$

$$\tilde{c} = \begin{pmatrix} 6 & 1 & 0 \\ 8 & 6 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \tilde{d} = \begin{pmatrix} 2 & 1 & 0 \\ 6 & 8 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \& \tilde{h}(\nu) = 5 \nu^2 + 3 \nu^2 + \nu + 2$$

Hence private key will be

$$\tilde{h}(\nu) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 8 & 6 & 1 \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 8 & 6 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \& \tilde{h}(\nu) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

Then, the corresponding public key would be

$$c \tilde{h}(\nu)^2 \ast d \tilde{h}(\nu)^3 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 8 & 6 & 1 \end{pmatrix} - \begin{pmatrix} 2 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

Give us a chance to pick a message $M$ arbitrarily, say $\nu = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 8 & 6 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$. Suppose the compound number we picked arbitrarily is $\nu = 15$. At that point, we separate a polynomial as takes after:

$$f(\nu) = (\nu^2 \mod \mathcal{N}) + (\nu^3 \mod \mathcal{N})u + (\nu^4 \mod \mathcal{N})u^2 + (\nu^5 \mod \mathcal{N})u^3 + (\nu^6 \mod \mathcal{N})u^4 + (\nu^7 \mod \mathcal{N})u^5 + (\nu^8 \mod \mathcal{N})u^6$$

Which gives?

$$\tilde{c}(\nu) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 8 & 6 & 1 \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 8 & 6 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \& \tilde{c}(\nu) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$+ 2 \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 8 & 6 & 1 \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 8 & 6 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \& \tilde{c}(\nu) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$+ 6 \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 8 & 6 & 1 \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 8 & 6 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \& \tilde{c}(\nu) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{pmatrix} 3 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \& \tilde{c}(\nu) = \begin{pmatrix} 2 \end{pmatrix}.$$
(Take note of that if \( f(u) \) does not satisfy the condition of \( f(c) \neq 0 \), we ought to at first amend \( f(u) \) to \( f(u) = f(u) + \Delta \). Where

\[ \Delta = \min \left\{ \xi \in 2^{\geq 0} : f(c) + \xi \cdot \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \neq 0 \right\} \]

Luckily, in this illustration. The above extracted \( f(u) \) meets the necessity of \( f(c) \neq 0 \), i.e., \( \Delta = 0 \). At that point, then cipher-text combine is

\[ \varepsilon = f(c)^{\ast} \ast d \ast f(c)^{3} = \begin{pmatrix} 8 & 0 & 0 \\ 4 & 8 & 0 \\ 2 & 4 & 8 \end{pmatrix} \ast \begin{pmatrix} 2 & 1 & 0 \\ 4 & 8 & 0 \\ 2 & 4 & 8 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 6 & 8 & 0 \\ 8 & 8 & 0 \\ 1 & 2 & 4 \end{pmatrix} \]

and

\[ t = (M \| \omega) \oplus f^{\ast}_{2}(f(c)^{2} \ast c \ast f(c)^{3}) \]

where

\[ t = \begin{pmatrix} 2 & 4 & 9 \\ 5 & 3 & 1 \\ 2 & 1 & 5 \end{pmatrix} \]

Presently, let us check the decryption process:

\[ M' = \varepsilon \oplus f_{2}(f(c)^{2} \ast d \ast f(c)^{3}) \]

\[ = \begin{pmatrix} 4 & 5 & 8 \\ 1 & 5 & 0 \\ 14 & 4 & 9 \end{pmatrix} \oplus f_{2}(\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 2 & 1 & 0 \\ 14 & 0 & 8 \end{pmatrix}) \]

\[ = \begin{pmatrix} 6 & 1 \ 4 & 1 \ 14 & 6 \ 4 & 6 \ 2 & 8 \ 6 & 6 \ 14 & 4 \ 5 & 4 \ \end{pmatrix} \]

6. Security Analysis and Discussion

In 1999, \(^{18}\) acquainted a strategy with change over an IND-CPA cryptographic technique into an IND-CCA2 cryptographic technique. For self-containing, we practice their principle thought as takes after:

Assume that \( \Lambda \rightarrow \{\Omega, \varepsilon_{H}, d_{c}\} \) is an IND-CPA secure public-key cryptographic technique with key generation procedure \( \Omega(1^{\nu}) \), encryption procedure \( \varepsilon_{H}(M, S) \) and decryption procedure \( d_{c}(c, \omega) \), where \( H(c) \) and \( c \) are a private key and the conforming public key, \( M \) a message with \( \nu \) bits, \( \omega \) a random string with \( l \) bits and \( C \) a cipher-text. The transformed public-key cryptographic technique \( \Lambda' \rightarrow \{\Omega, \varepsilon_{H}, d_{c}\} \) is defined by \( \Omega(1^{\nu}) \rightarrow \Omega(1^{\nu + \nu'}) \),

\[ \varepsilon_{H}(M, \omega) \rightarrow \varepsilon_{H}(m \| \omega, f_{j}(m \| \omega)) \]

\[ d_{c}(c, \omega) := \begin{pmatrix} d_{c}(c, \omega) \end{pmatrix} \], if \( C = \varepsilon_{H}(d_{c}(c, \omega), f_{j}(d_{c}(c, \omega), \omega)) \),

where \( f_{j} : \left\{ 0,1 \right\}^{\nu + \nu'} \rightarrow \left\{ 0,1 \right\}^{l} \) is a random function of, \( m \) is a message with \( \nu \) bits, \( \nu \) an arbitrary string with \( \nu \) bits and || denotes concatenation.

6.1 Theorem 6.1

Assume that \( \Lambda \rightarrow \Omega(1^{\nu + \nu'}) \) is the first IND-CPA secure cryptographic technique and \( \Lambda' \) is changed over technique. In the event that \( \exists a \left( t', \varepsilon_{H}, \varepsilon_{d}, \varepsilon_{\omega} \right) \)-adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) for \( \Lambda(1^{\nu}) \) in the sense of IND-CCA2 in the ROM, \( \exists \left( t', \varepsilon_{H}, \varepsilon_{d}, \varepsilon_{\omega} \right) \)-adversary \( \mathcal{A}' \) for \( \Lambda(1^{\nu + \nu'}) \) and constant \( c \), where

\[ \varepsilon_{\omega} = \left( \varepsilon_{0} - \frac{\varepsilon_{H}}{2^{\nu + \nu' + 1}} \right) \ast \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 2 & 4 & 9 \\ 4 & 6 & 6 \end{pmatrix} \]

\[ t' = t + \begin{pmatrix} c \ast k + T_{k}(\nu) \\ c \ast k + T_{k}(\nu) \end{pmatrix} \]

Here, \( \left( t', \varepsilon_{H}, \varepsilon_{d}, \varepsilon_{\omega} \right) \)-adversary \( \mathcal{A} \), casually, implies that \( \mathcal{A} \) stops inside \( t \) stages, prevails with probability in any event, makes at most \( q_{H} \) inquiries to \( H \), and most \( q_{d} \) inquiries to decryption oracle \( d_{c}(c, \omega) \)
The computational time of the encryption procedure \( \tilde{e}_{C,A}(\cdot) \) is \( T_\varepsilon(k) \) and

\[
\ell_0 \mapsto \log_2 \left( \min_{m \in [1]} \left[ \# \left\{ \tilde{e}_{n,C,A}(M, \omega) \mid \omega \in \{0, 1\}^n \right\} \right] \right).
\]

Proof. See Theorem 3 of \[3\].

As indicated in \[3\], we can changeover our fundamental public key cryptographic technique into more secure new public key cryptographic technique, which comes to IND-CCA2 security, with sacrificing of \( \eta_0 \) bits plaintext.

### 6.2 Theorem 6.2

Let \( f_j \) be a random oracle and \( A \) be an IND-CPA foe that has advantage against the purpose fundamental technique inside \( \eta \) iterations. Assume that \( A \) makes a \( q_{f_j} \) total of inquiries to \( f_j \). Then there is a procedure \( A \) that resolves polynomial Diffie-Hellman problem over \( d_{\omega'} \) with advantage at least \( \epsilon' \) within \( \eta' \) iterations, where

\[
\tilde{e}_{n'} = \frac{2 \tilde{e}_{n_k}}{q_{f_j}}, \quad \epsilon' = O(\Omega).
\]

Proof. See the Theorem 6 of \[9\].

### 6.3 Theorem 6.3

Assume that \( f_1 \) and \( f_2 \) are two random oracles. Then the presented public key cryptographic technique is an IND-CCA2 accepting polynomial Diffie-Hellman problem over the Suzuki 2-group \( G_S \) is hard. All that has been assumed is an IND-CCA2 foe \( A \) that has advantage against the presented public key cryptographic technique inside \( t \) steps. Assume that adversary \( A \) makes at most \( q_D \) decryption inquiries, and at most \( q_{f_1}, q_{f_2} \) inquiries to the hash functions \( f_1 \) and \( f_2 \) respectively. Then there is a technique \( B \) which can solve polynomial Diffie-Hellman problem with the probability at least \( \eta \) inside \( t_0 \) steps, where

\[
e_{n'} = \frac{2}{q_{f_{1}}} \left[ \frac{e_{n_k} 2^{-\eta_0}}{2^{\eta_0} - 1} q_D + \frac{q_{f_2}}{2^{\eta_0} - 1} \right]
\]

\[
t' = O(t + (ck + T_\varepsilon(\omega))q_{f_2})
\]

where \( c \) is a constant and \( T_\varepsilon(\psi) \) represents the computational time of the encryption process \( \tilde{e}_{n,C,A}(\cdot) \) in our purposed public key cryptographic technique, and

\[
\ell_0 \mapsto \log_2 \left( \min_{m \in [1]} \left[ \# \left\{ \tilde{e}_{n,C,A}(M, \omega) \mid \omega \in \{0, 1\}^n \right\} \right] \right).
\]

### 6.4 Proof

We At first, from Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 6.2, it promptly presumes that our presented public key cryptographic technique comes to IND-CCA2 security in the ROM assuming that polynomial Diffie-Hellman problem is hard. Then, consolidating the consequences of both the IND-CPA hypothesis and Fujisaki-Okamoto hypothesis, we get the above limits.

### 6.5 Remark

It is critical the elaborations on completing a cryptographic hash that maps a binary string to a polynomial, for example, \( f_j : \{0,1\}^{\omega+\eta_0} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{u} \). Specifically, the ensuing polynomials should assist imperatives, for instance, the condition \( \tilde{f}(\omega') = 0 \) et cetera. We utilize the purported separate and overcome system to deal with this issue: At first, we extricate a polynomial \( f'(\omega) \in f(\omega) + \) from a binary string in \( \{0,1\}^{\omega+\eta_0} \). Then, we receive an interesting deterministic approach to correct \( \hat{f}(\omega') \) to \( \tilde{f}(\omega') \) with the end goal that \( \tilde{f}(\omega') \) satisfies the sought condition \( C \).

### 6.6 Extracting

In exercise, we need to pick huge coefficients polynomials with low degrees. Allow us to acknowledge that the most vital degree is \( d_{\omega} \) and the largest coefficient is \( c_M \), then \( d_{\omega} - c_M \) ought to be sufficiently extensive resist brute force attack. Thusly, there is a trivial solution to implement \( f_j \): Assume that we starting at now have a cryptographic hash function \( f_j : \{0,1\}^{\omega+\eta_0} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{d_{\omega}+1} \).

### 6.7 Rectifying

Assume we embrace an added substance rectifying strategy. At that point, for coming about polynomial \( f'(\omega) \), it can be rectified to \( f'(\omega) = f(\omega) + \Delta \) while

\[
\Delta = \min_{C} \left\{ C \in \{0,1\}^{\omega+\eta_0} : f(C) + \eta_0 \right\} \in \{0,1\}^{\omega+\eta_0} \cap \{0,1\}^{\omega+\eta_0}
\]

where \( \{0,1\}^{\omega+\eta_0} \cap \{0,1\}^{\omega+\eta_0} \) is the arrangement of polynomials in \( \{0,1\}^{\omega+\eta_0} \) fulfilling the given condition \( C \).
6.8 Collision-Resisting
The above correcting procedure is not to abuse the property of collision resistance. In fact, the collision resistance of $f_1$ is established in the one-wayness of $f'$.

7. Conclusions
In this study, we demonstrated new approach for designing the public key cryptographic technique using the concept of general non-commutative algebraic system such as Suzuki 2-group. Also we discussed the new strategy with change over an IND-CPA cryptographic technique into an IND-CCA2 cryptographic technique. By using this new strategy we change our past IND-CPA public key cryptographic technique into a more secure IND-CCA2 public key cryptographic technique. The principle thought in our suggestion lies that we consider polynomials on given non-commutative arithmetical framework as the major work structure for creating cryptographic arrangements. Consequently, we can get some commutative sub-structures for the given non-commutative scientific systems.

8. References