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Authentication through Presence in Wireless Networks


  • Department of Computer Science, College of Computer Engineering, Safadasht Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran, Islamic Republic of


Background/Objectives: In this study, we present Integrity Regions (IRegions), as a new security measure which can ensure proper authentication of messages exchange in a wireless network without using recertified or reestablished keys. This objective will be achieved by time-of-arrival ranging techniques to verify the location of target entity. Despite the vulnerability of ultrasonic ranging to distance modification attacks, it can be used to implement this method soundly and efficiently. Methods: Verification of presence is the solution implanted into Integrity regions (IRegions) to protect against MITM attacks mounted on wireless connections. Findings: This method can efficiently use range measurements to protect the system against attacks mounted by intercepting messages exchanged in the connection for each received message. This technique forces devices to verify each received message by checking that whether its source is located in an expected range (i.e., within the area called integrity region). Once the source of message is proved to be within the expected (safe) range, it will be accepted as authentic. This method therefore does not allow an MITM attack to be mounted from distance. In the case of suspicion of MITM attack, visually checking the area in the vicinity of device is enough to make sure that whether connection is safe or there is a chance that connection security is compromised. Application/Improvements: Both radio time of arrival and ultrasonic ranging methods can be used to realize IRegions; but using ultrasonic ranging because of its lower hardware requirements is the preferred course of action.


Authentication, Integrity Regions, Network Security, Wireless network

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